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There is general agreement that ‘work’ is a primary concept for Cognitive 
Ergonomics (CE).  However, there is little agreement how the domain of 
work might best be modelled.  This paper assesses two contrasting 
approaches to such modelling.  The first, and implicit approach, derives 
from domain experts.  The second, and explicit approach, derives from 
domain research.  The approaches are illustrated by an initial analysis of the 
domain of military command and control and specifically of models of the 
Vincennes incident.  Implicit and explicit domain models are assessed in 
terms of the incident events.  It is concluded that both models have potential 
to support design, but the explicit model also has potential to support 
research.  The need for explicit domain modelling to support validation of 
CE design knowledge is underlined. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is general agreement that for Ergonomics, and in particular for Cognitive 
Ergonomics (CE) – the concern here – ‘work’ is the primary concept, expressing its 
scope.  Ergonomics was originally derived from two Greek words: ‘ergos’ meaning work 
and ‘nomos’ meaning (natural) laws, and so ‘laws of work’ (Murrell, 1971).  Work, 
domain, environment etc. reflect Ergonomics’ and so CE’s concern with work (Murrell, 
1971; Card et al., 1983; Long 1987; Galer, 1989; Carroll, 1991; Pheasant, 1991; Dix et 
al., 1993; and Oborne, 1994).  There is also agreement as to the other primary concepts 
of CE, for example users, technology and performance etc. (Flach, 1998; Vicente, 1998; 
and Long 2001).  However, there is little or no agreement as to how the domain of work 
should be modelled for CE design and research.  Two contrasting approaches can be 
discerned. 
The first, and implicit, approach derives from domain experts (Murrell, 1971; Card 
et al., 1983; Galer, 1989; Pheasant, 1991; Dix et al., 1993; and Oborne, 1994).  These 
experts are highly knowledgeable about individual domains of work and their knowledge 
informs CE design and research.  The second, and explicit, approach derives from 
research into domain models (Dowell and Long, 1998; Flach, 1998; and Vicente, 1998).  
Domain models represent work explicitly. 
The aim of this paper is to assess implicit and explicit domain models for CE design 
and research.  The assessment is based on an illustration, taken from an initial analysis of 
the work domain of military command and control (C2) and specifically as embodied in 
the Vincennes incident. 
 
 
Illustration: the Vincennes Incident 
 
The Vincennes incident was widely reported (see The London Times, 4 and 5 July, 1988; 
and Time Magazine, 18 July 1988) and was also the object of an official report (USDoD, 
1988).  The incident took place during the Iran/Iraq war, initially a land battle.  In the 
late 1980s, Iraq attempted to disrupt Iran’s oil trade.  Iraq launched air attacks against 
Iranian oil installations.  Iran’s response was to disrupt oil transport in the Persian Gulf.  
The US response was to send naval forces to ensure oil supplies.  The incident occurred 
on the morning of 3 July, 1988.  The Iraqi Air Force had successfully attacked Iranian 
forces near the North Persian Gulf.  Iranian retaliation of small boat attacks on 
commercial shipping was expected.  The incident occurred when the USS Vincennes 
mistakenly shot down civilian Iran Air Flight 655, while simultaneously engaging a 
group of Iranian small boats. 
 
 
Implicit Domain Model 
 
The domain of work here is that of C2.  The main sources of information about C2 are 
military domain experts using C2 systems.  Here, the C2 model is implicit in the experts’ 
descriptions of the Vincennes incident in the official report.  A selection is summarised 
in the left column of Appendix 1. 
The incident events are described in C2 systems expert language.  For example: 
“0649 Flight 655 adopts its flight path, which is toward the Vincennes.  The Vincennes 
challenges its air contact (actually Flight 655), but receives no reply”.  The language 
comprises both ordinary expressions (“receives no reply”), as well as technical 
expressions (“Flight 655 adopts its flight path”).  However, neither expresses C2 
explicitly, only in the specific terms of the events.  Further, C2 domain aspects (“The 
missiles destroy Flight 655”) and C2 system aspects  (“Vincennes’ air contact appears 
electronically to identify itself as a military aircraft”) both appear, but are not 
distinguished.  The domain of the Vincennes incident is undoubtedly that of C2, derived 
from experts, but the model of C2 remains implicit.  The model informs the experts’ 
explicit descriptions, but is not itself explicit. 
 
 
Explicit domain model 
 
The domain of a worksystem is the work it performs (Dowell and Long, 1998).  The 
domain comprises objects, constituted of attributes, having values.  A worksystem 
comprises interactive user and device behaviours, which, when executed, perform tasks 
effectively (transforming the domain, so to achieve desired goal states).  Here, C2 
performs two types of work, and so is modelled as two domains: the domain of plans for 
armed conflict and the domain of armed conflict.  The domain of plans comprises a 
single object – an interest – with a single attribute – security (model concepts are in 
bold initially).  An interest specifies a use of resources by a nation state.  Uses may be 
political, military etc.  Resources include the land, sea, air, space and installations etc.  
Security is the potential to realise an interest. 
Within the domain of armed-conflict (military operations), the domain objects are 
identified as: friends, enemies and neutrals.  These objects are distinguished by the 
ends pursued.  A friend supports the interests pursued by C2.  An enemy, in contrast, 
pursues incompatible interests.  Neutrals pursue interests, compatible with those of both 
friends and enemies.  The domain also comprises a resource object, whose use attribute 
is interest.  The three classes of participant object exhibit between them attributes of 
power, vulnerability and involvement.  Power, here, is the potential to secure interests 
by the display of force. 
One participant’s potential to damage another implies the latter’s weakness.  That is, 
power implies vulnerability.  The power of one participant, and the reciprocal 
vulnerability of another, implies the involvement.  Friends and enemies may exhibit 
power/threat, vulnerability and involvement.  Neutrals, in contrast, only exhibit 
vulnerability and involvement (for a complete description, see Colbert and Long , 1995). 
This explicit domain model of C2 was used to model the Vincennes incident.  A 
selection from the application is summarised on the right of Appendix 1.  Domain 
concepts are in bold.  The appendix shows how the concepts are able to describe the 
domain transformations of the left column.  For example, “The small boats and the 
Vincennes continue to close” is expressed by the domain model as: “The involvement, 
power and vulnerability of the friend (Vincennes) and the enemy increase again”.  The 
appendix also demonstrates the explicitness of the concepts – by their identification.  
Finally, the model expresses only the transformations of the domain, not the behaviours 
of the C2 worksystem. 
 
 
Domain model assessment 
 
Both CE domain models, implicit and explicit, constitute CE design knowledge, intended 
to support design and research.  CE design can be conceived as the diagnosis (of design 
problems) and the prescription (of design solutions) (Long, 2001).  CE research can be 
conceived as the acquisition and validation of design knowledge (Long, 2001).  Implicit 
and explicit models are now assessed for their potential to support design and research. 
The implicit model of C2 would appear to have potential to support design as both 
diagnosis and prescription.  For example:  “Flight 655’s altitude is misread.  The air 
contact is perceived as diving towards the Vincennes; in fact, it is climbing away from 
it”.  Misreading the altitude is obviously an error and hence constitutes a design problem.  
Further details concerning the misreading of the flight altitude might be expected to 
inform a prescription, that is, a design solution.  Altitude might be more clearly 
displayed, using colour or spatial coding. 
In contrast, the implicit model of C2 would appear to have little potential for 
informing research.  Validation of design knowledge requires its conceptualisation, 
operationalisation, test and generalisation.  Since the model is implicit, it is not 
(explicitly) conceptualised.  Hence, it cannot be operationalised, tested or generalised, 
and so validated. 
The explicit model of C2 would also appear to have potential to support design.  For 
example: ”The involvement and vulnerability of the neutral and the friend’s power 
with respect to it continue to increase rapidly”.  The greater involvement and 
vulnerability of a neutral is obviously an instance of ineffectiveness – hence a design 
problem – here resulting in “The friend’s power with respect to the neutral is realised, 
with catastrophic results”.  The model also informs prescription, that is, a design 
solution, as it specifies the required domain state, that is, an ‘uninvolved and non-
vulnerable neutral’.  Note the model does not inform design of the behaviours of the C2 
system itself, that is, how the neutral’s uninvolvement and non-vulnerability might be 
brought about. 
The explicit model would also appear to have the potential for informing research.  
As the C2 concepts are explicit, it meets the requirement of research for 
conceptualisation.  Since conceptualised, the model offers the potential for 
operationalisation, test and generalisation.  Iran Flight 655 can be conceived and 
operationalised as a neutral, because its interest – civilian, commercial air transport – is 
compatible with both those of friends and enemies (see earlier).  Once operationalised, 
the concepts can be tested and generalised.  Note that the explicit model characterises C2 
as a class of domain, the Vincennes incident constituting an instance of the class. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has assessed two contrasting approaches for their potential to model the 
domain of work for CE in support of design and research.  It is concluded that both 
implicit, expert and explicit, research domain models have the potential to support design 
practice.  However, the nature of the support is different.  Implicit models support (re-) 
design of the instance, here embodied in the Vincennes incident, but not of the C2  class 
(which remains implicit).  In contrast, explicit domain models express the instance, 
embodied in the Vincennes incident, as a member of the C2 class.  Explicit model support 
for design is thus more general than implicit support.  In contrast, explicit support is 
more limited, as it excludes the C2 system itself.  As concerns research, only explicit 
domain models have the potential to provide support, because implicit C2 models cannot 
be validated in the absence of conceptualisation. 
It is concluded, that implicit domain models of C2 are needed, in the shorter term, to 
inform design of individual C2 systems.  Explicit modelling is currently in its infancy.  
However, explicit domain models offer the possibility of validation by research and so a 
better guarantee, in the longer term, of support for both design and research.  The 
importance of explicit, domain models needs to be underlined and its further 
development encouraged.  Only in this way can CE hope to progress from a craft to a 
more formal engineering discipline, so increasing the guarantee of its design knowledge. 
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Appendix 1: An implicit, expert model (left column) and an explicit domain 
model (right column) of the Vincennes incident 
 
0330 USS Montgomery reports that about 
seven Iranian small boats have challenged a 
tanker.  Explosions are heard. 
0330 The power of the enemy (the 
small boats) with respect to the resource 
(tanker) increases.  The enemy makes 
attempts to realise its power.  The 
security' of the US interest is reduced. 
0412 The Vincennes is ordered to the area 
to support Montgomery and investigate 
reports of small boats challenging a tanker. 
0412 The friend's (Vincennes') 
power and involvement increase, and 
the vulnerability of the enemy increases 
accordingly. 
0610 The Vincennes' helicopter is diverted 
from a patrol to reconnoitre the small boats.  
By so doing, the helicopter and the small 
boats come within range of each other. 
0610 The involvement, power and 
vulnerability of the friend (Vincennes' 
helicopter) and the enemy increase 
rapidly. 
0615 The helicopter is fired upon by the 
small boats, but no damage is inflicted.  
Having established the small boats' intentions, 
the helicopter returns to the Vincennes. 
0615 An attempt to realise the 
friend's vulnerability fails.  Levels of 
power, vulnerability and involvement 
reduce. 
 0620 The small boats and the Vincennes 
continue to close. 
0620 The involvement, power and 
vulnerability of the friend (Vincennes) 
and the enemy increase again. 
0643 The small boats and the Vincennes 
continue to close.  Two small boats turn 
towards the Vincennes, while the other small 
boats manoeuvre erratically.  (By so doing, 
the small boats have been drawn away from 
the tanker.) 
0643 The involvement, power and 
vulnerability of the friend and the 
enemy continue to rise. (The friend's 
vulnerability, however, is relatively 
low.)  The US interest appears more 
secure. 
0647 Flight 655 takes off from Bandar 
Abbas, and is detected by the Vincennes, as 
an 'unknown, presumed enemy'. 
0647 The involvement of the neutral 
(Flight 655) and the friend begins to 
increase. 
0649 Flight 655 adopts its flight path, 
which is towards the Vincennes.  The 
Vincennes challenges its air contact (actually 
Flight 655), but receives no reply.  The period 
immediately after take-off is a busy time for 
flight crew, so they may not have been 
monitoring Air Distress frequencies.  For a 
moment, Vincennes' air contact appears 
electronically to identify itself as a military 
aircraft (due to freak weather conditions?).  
Flight 655 is approaching the range of 
Vincennes' missiles. 
0649 The involvement and 
vulnerability of the neutral, and the 
friend's power with respect to it, 
increases rapidly. 
0651 One of the Vincennes' guns jams 
when one of the small boats is about to adopt 
a dangerous position.  A sharp change in 
course brings the remaining gun to bear on 
the small boat posing the greatest threat.  
Further challenges to the air contact receive 
no reply.  Flight 655 is now within range of 
the Vincennes' missiles.  Flight 655's altitude 
is mis-read.  The air contact is perceived as 
diving towards the Vincennes; in fact, it is 
climbing away from it. 
0651 The power of the friend with 
respect to the neutral temporarily falls 
sharply, but is soon restored.  The 
vulnerability of the enemy fluctuates 
accordingly.  The power of one enemy 
also rises slightly before falling back.  
The friend's vulnerability fluctuates 
accordingly.  The involvement and 
vulnerability of the neutral and the 
friend's power with respect to it 
continue to increase rapidly. 
0654 Two surface to air missiles are 
launched by the Vincennes, in the belief that 
the ship is under attack from an enemy 
fighter.  The missiles destroy Flight 655. 
0654 The friend's power with respect 
to the neutral is realised, with 
catastrophic results. 
0703 The small boats leave the area.  One 
has been destroyed and the Vincennes has 
incurred superficial damage from small arms 
fire or shrapnel.  The Vincennes learns that is 
has mistakenly shot down a commercial 
aircraft. 
0703 The power of the enemy (with 
respect to the friend) reduces, as does 
the involvement of all parties.  The 
friend's power with respect to the 
enemy has also been realised. 
 
